

Marginalization Through Citizenship

A Glimpse of the Exclusion of Scheduled Castes in Manipur

Vishal Jadhav

This paper examines how the ideology and the classificatory policies of the Indian state such as cataloguing the nation on the basis of identities – forward and backward caste, upper and lower class, forward and backward region, majority and minorities in religion, urban and rural areas – leads to the construction of a rather rigid framework through which citizenship operates. This paper argues that by this practice of recognizing group-based and territorial-based identities and spaces, the State creates ambiguities and thus derecognizes large sections of the Scheduled Castes individuals who find it difficult to identify with this state classificatory schema. In this paper, the plight of the Scheduled Castes individuals and communities of Manipur vis-à-vis the State is examined. The Scheduled Castes population of Manipur in 2001 Census totals 60,037 individuals, which constitutes 2.8 per cent of the total population of the State. The State has registered 61.8 per cent decadal growth of Scheduled Castes population in 1991–2001. There are seven notified Scheduled Castes (SCs) communities in the State: Lois (86.1%), Patni (5.6%), Namasudra (5.5%), Yaithibi (0.9%), Sutradhar (0.2%), Dhupi (0.1%) and Muchi (0.1%).¹ The SCs population of Manipur is primarily Hindu. Of the total of 60,037 SCs in 2001 Census, 60,007 are returned as Hindus, 24 Sikhs and only 6 Buddhists. The Lois and the Yaithibi are the only two Scheduled Castes communities that originally

belonged to Manipur. The rest of them are migrant communities from adjoining States (Laisram, 2004).

Manipur is administratively divided into nine districts, namely, Bishnupur, Chandel, Churachandpur, Imphal east, Imphal west, Tamenglong, Thoubal and Ukhrul. The population of Manipur in 2001 Census has been 2,166,788. Of this 741,141 are Scheduled Tribes (STs), which constitutes 34.2 per cent of the total population of the State.² Besides the Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes there is another marginalized community, i.e. the Muslim community which constitutes almost 8 per cent of the total population of the State. They are labelled as *Pangals* in Manipur and most of them are refugees who settled here after the 1971 war. Of the total STs in Manipur, *Thadou* is the largest with 1.8 lakh population representing 24.6 per cent of the State's total STs population, followed by *Tangkhui* (19.7%), *Kabui* (11.1%), *Paite* (6.6%), *Hmar* (5.8%), *Kacha Naga* (5.7%) and *Vaiphei* (5.2%). Among other major tribes, *Maring*, *Anal*, *Zou*, *Any Mizo* (*Lushai*) tribes, *Kom* and *Simte* are having percentage between 3.1 and 1.5. The STs population in Manipur is predominantly rural with 95.3 per cent rural and 4.7 per cent urban population. Of the thirteen major STs, *Kacha Naga* (99%), *Anal* (98.5%), *Maring* (98.2%), and *Simte* (98.1%) have returned to majority (98–99%) of their population in rural areas. Ukhrul, Tamenglong, Churachandpur and Chandel are predominantly tribal districts having more than 90 per cent of the district's population as Scheduled Tribes.³ Senapati has recorded 78.5 per cent of its population as Scheduled Tribes. These five districts together hold 92.4 per cent of the State's total STs population. The rest of the four districts of Manipur have negligible percentage of STs Population (Census 2001, http://censusindia.gov.in/Tables_Published/SCST/dh_st_manipur.pdf).

It is no secret that the tribals in central and western India are one of the most marginalized communities in the country, but this would not hold true at least in the north-eastern parts of the country and, therefore, in Manipur. The Indian State has divided the tribal population in the country on the basis of physical space and geographical location. It has not taken account of the differential historical trajectories of these disparate tribal communities and has instead continued viewing them through the colonial lens as a

monolith category who are mainly forest dwellers practising animistic religions. Also it assumes that the tribals are socially and culturally primitive. Rather than distinguishing these communities in terms of their socio-economic attributes, the State has located them in spatial terms; these places being identified in terms of the proportion of tribal population in residence. Thus, it has designated some parts of the country as tribal territory and also has made special efforts to develop these regions through tribal sub-plans. But this was not so in case of the Scheduled Castes communities and there exist no such sub-plans for this community. Why is this so, and does this threaten the livelihood chances of the Scheduled Castes individuals in Manipur?

The tribal communities in Manipur predominantly belong to the Christian denomination and display a high level of literacy. The high literacy level and a fair level of westernization have allowed many of these individuals to get placed in Central and State services. Besides, as most of the grant-in-aid and special packages such as tribal sub-plans, tribal area development plans, special drives amongst many others, have empowered these tribal groups/communities (unlike their counterparts in the rest of the country). In the central and western regions of India where the tribal population is concentrated, the Indian State has encouraged exploitation of natural resources, inauguration of large-scale projects (Special Economic Zones, Reserved forests, hydel and thermal power projects among others) which has not only displaced many of the tribal communities but also culturally uprooted them from their moorings.

There is however another problem that is plaguing the State of Manipur and other States in North-East India – the menace of insurgency which initially had its beginnings in separatist movements. Currently, this region is placed under the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), which confers special powers on military and paramilitary forces. There have been several civil society mobilizations in these 'disturbed areas' (in the States of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura) to draw attention of the nation to the gross human rights and human dignity violations. The North-East in many ways invokes a sense of a *distant* land in the minds of most

Indians. So much so that since the post-independence period, the Indian State lacks the imagination and the necessary will to improve the political economy of this region. Just providing grant-in-aid and subsidies has really not sufficed in bringing this region at par with other States of the country, at least in terms of the development model that the Indian State has embarked on (Baruah, 2005; Chatterjee, 1993, 1997, 2004).

In recent times, the State of Manipur has been the site of the most violent unrest. There are more than 29 insurgent groups that represent various ethnic groups in the State.⁴ In a situation where the citizen is caught between the conflict involving the armed forces and paramilitary forces on one hand, and the insurgents on the other, it becomes a desperate situation. The case of *Sharmila* whose plea to reign in the extraordinary powers of the state and the cries demanding justice seems to be fading from our memories, only goes to show how indifferent we, as a nation, have become towards such instances of State violence occurring in the North-East (Nag, 2002; Sharma, 2000).

The incongruity of the misassumption of the State possibly stands out rather starkly in this case – on the one hand the State believes that insurgency can be controlled if not ended through the AFSPA, and on the other, the State doles out sizeable resources through its grant-in-aid system and also encourages the local government institutions to vigorously pursue the scheme.

Of much significance is the fact that there exists a parallel State in Manipur. Fieldwork indicated that the insurgents have taken over as the negotiators, i.e. the link between the common citizen and the State. Thus, for instance, a citizen who needs to procure a license to sell petrol or kerosene, a motor driving license, domicile certificate, permission to open and operate a school/shop/enterprise, marriage certificate, birth certificate, job cards for MNREGA, getting pension sanctioned, public contracts, etc. approach insurgent groups who provide these facilities at a commission. The insurgent groups work hand in glove with State officials (either by invoking fear or by bribing) and ensure that the individuals who can afford such transactions (having requisite social, cultural and symbolic capital) get benefits. Such kind of interactions involves operationalization of primordial identities

such as tribal and ethnic identities. As the Scheduled Castes (SCs) communities constitute only around 2.8 per cent of the total population in Manipur, they hardly have any negotiating power to access their citizenship rights. Moreover, as the State is predominantly upper caste Hindus (66%) and tribals (34.2%), the reservation quota is generally accessed by the tribal communities. In such a context the Scheduled Castes individuals remain excluded and marginalized.

As the State is placed under the martial law, the common people are caught amidst the conflict involving the armed forces and paramilitary forces on one hand, and the insurgents on the other. This conflict has affected the civil administration which has almost collapsed. For instance, the supply of electric power is sporadic and intermittent and sometimes does not reach the citizens for days together. The State is also not evident when it comes to collecting sales tax and property tax. Most of the time, it is the insurgent groups that collect these taxes on behalf of the State or keep it for themselves (Baruah, 2005; Nag, 2002; Sharma, 2000).

The SCs population of Manipur is primarily concentrated in Thoubal district (Kakching block), which accounts for 56.6 per cent of the total SCs population of the state. Other two districts have sizeable proportion of SCs population like Imphal West (22.1%) and Imphal East in *Sekmai block* (17.3%). One can also locate sparsely populated SCs pockets in the district of Bishnupur (Thanga and Leimaram village). With the advent of colonialism their traditional way of life was completely destroyed as modernity and industrialization began to replace the traditional system. Currently, the SCs communities are predominantly urban based, i.e. 65.3 per cent reside in urban areas and find their source of livelihood in these areas (2001 Census).

The *Lois* which is the largest SCs community in the State has the highest urban population with 74.5 per cent. It is followed by the *Yithibi* community that has 37 per cent amongst them, being urban based. The *Namasudra* and *Patni* communities on the other hand, have maximum membership based in rural areas – their percentage is (96.1%) and (99.9%) respectively. What is also interesting is that the SCs population in the State exhibits a high proportion of literacy level.⁵ According to 2001 Census, in Manipur

72.3 per cent of the SCs population is literate, with the *Namasudra* recording the highest literacy rate of 73.4 per cent, followed by the *Lois* (72.5%) and *Yaithibi* (70.5%). The *Patni* is the least literate (65.9%) among the four main SCs communities. The 2001 Census has also documented another interesting facet, i.e. statistics regarding higher education. Manipur is one of the leading states having 12.8 per cent of its total SCs literates having graduate and above educational level. The *Lois* with 14.4 per cent is significantly ahead of other SCs such as *Yaithibi* (5.5%), *Namasudra* (0.6%) and *Patni* (0.4%).

According to the 2001 Census report, the percentage of Scheduled Castes workers to total population stood at 51.4 per cent, which is higher than the aggregated figure for SCs at national level (40.4%). The breakup of these SCs workers reveals that 67.4 per cent have been recorded as main workers and 32.6 per cent as marginal workers. Another interesting facet worth mentioning here is that the female work participation rate (WPR) stood at 47.5 per cent. The *Lois* community has recorded the highest work participation rate which stood at around 53.1 per cent. A noteworthy fact is that among *Lois*, men and women contribute more or less equally to the household economy, i.e. the work participation rate is 55.4 per cent and 50.8 per cent respectively. The *Yaithibi* has recorded comparatively a low WPR at 47.9 per cent. However, their female WPR (48.4%) is higher than that of their male (47.5%). The WPR is quite low at 35.5 per cent among *Namasudra*, followed by *Patni* (36.6%).

Most of the Scheduled Castes individuals are bereft of land and mostly work as agricultural labourers. They possess small patches of land especially in hilly terrains. As a percentage of the total work force amongst the SCs 35.3 per cent of them have been reported to be employed as cultivators (marginal cultivators, who only produce rice) and 12.3 per cent as agricultural labourers. Together, the largest chunk of the SCs workers is employed in agricultural activities, i.e. 47.6 per cent. According to the 2001 Census report, between the four main SCs communities in Manipur, *Patni* has recorded the highest 49.4 per cent of their total main workers as cultivators, closely followed by *Namasudra* (48.6%), while it is only 37.4 per cent among *Lois*. The *Yaithibi* has recorded the lowest at 8.8 per cent. They, however, have recorded

the highest, 32.5 per cent agricultural labourers. Thus, one can also notice stratification amongst the SCs population. The *Yaithibi* is the most marginalized among the seven notified Scheduled Castes. As employment is seasonal in agriculture-related occupations, they migrate to the nearest district headquarters or urban areas to search for a livelihood. All the communities are predominantly found to be employed in the unorganized sector such as at construction sites, road making, and rock quarrying, making and selling illicit liquor amongst many other such occupations. Their women are also to be found in large numbers in prostitution and selling of narcotic drugs (Interviews conducted by the researcher in 2011).

The traditional occupation of the *Lois* was handicraft and cottage industries in the 19th century. The various sub-castes among this community were also specialists in the art of carpentry, blacksmith, weaving, jewellery, pottery and others. Some of the villages in which the *Lois* population was predominant had become famous during the colonial period, such that during the census exercise the British had unknowingly catalogued these *Lois* village names as sub-castes of the *Lois* community for instance, the Sekmai village in East Imphal was known for producing high quality alcoholic liquor (made from rice) and the *Lois* residing here came to be known as *Sekmai*. Similarly the villages Khurkhul, Leimaram and Phayeng which were sites of fine quality of silk yarn soon came to be recognized as groups of people. Also the Andro, Chairel and Thongjao villages known for its artistic pottery came to be sub-castes of the *Lois*. Waikhong village which was famous for its high quality rock salt came to be congruent to a sub-caste of the *Lois* (Laisram, 2004).

Though the Constitution of India recognizes citizenship at two levels, i.e. at an individual level and the other at a community level, it was only the communitarian identity that has been highlighted until now. The following section will try and assess some of the implications of such a bias by the Indian State. For one, in Manipur, where the tribal population is predominant, most of the reservation quota and other developmental benefits inherently go to these communities. In such a case the Indian State should make the necessary amendments to ensure that the marginalized among other communities also get a fair chance in accessing resources of the State.

Citizenship Through a Communitarian Identity

To comprehend how community identities got reinforced and routinized as a way of accessing State sponsored welfare programmes, it becomes necessary to understand how the Indian State conceptualizes citizenship in India. The paper argues that it is the State practice of classification that has inherent exclusionary manifestations. The Indian State recognizes individuals as citizens through the dual lens of formal and communitarian citizenship. Thus, the birth certificate, domicile certificate, election card, ration card among such other identity providing documents enables the individual to claim formal citizenship. However, this formal citizenship is not substantive in nature and, therefore, leaves the poor and the destitute to fend for identity, livelihood and social security all by themselves. At another level, the State also recognizes another level of citizenship, especially, when disbursing resources, i.e. communitarian citizenship. For instance, the State language recognizes group identity rather than formal individual identities when it recognizes social categories such as religious and linguistic minorities, backward regions, forward castes, Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and SCs, STs and other tribes, urban and rural spaces, forward and backward States (such as the BIMARU) among others. Many a times these categories and individuals do not superimpose and this leads to marginalization of the most powerless and the poor.

This section of Manipur people do not possess the kind of social networking that other 'citizens' can access through the State recognized communitarian framework. Moreover, many of the poor have shifting identities, especially the poor migrant labourers who sometimes do not even have a residential proof. The State demands certain set of bureaucratic procedures, to claim formal citizenship. Many cannot even obtain these and are non-existent for the State.

The Indian State and Its Classificatory Policies

In the early decades following independence, it was realized by the nationalist political actors that Indian society was markedly manifest in deep inequalities – at the social, cultural, political and material levels. These disparities and differences were partly

inherited during colonialism and partly exaggerated due to the processes of electoral democracy in the post-independence era. With India adopting a democratic model, these differences, which were social and cultural markers, were translated into political identities. Identities such as caste, religion, language and ethnicity became important conduits through which political power was organized. This was because the Indian State in its Constitutional framework followed a classificatory policy – such as cataloguing and recognizing the nation on the basis of religion, caste, tribe, class, region, language and also on the basis of rural and urban settings. The then political leadership, led by Nehru, believed that the only way to 'modernize' India was to have a centralized top-down planning approach. It was in this context that the Planning Commission was inaugurated which continues to plan and decide for the whole country even today. Though this classificatory policy did help in mapping and reducing poverty, it also created stereotypes that have led to exclusion of many at individual level.

By constructing such classifications to enable better targeting we argue that the Indians oversimplified sociabilities. We contend that it is high time that the State began to derecognize these imaginary categories as representations of homogenous group of individuals. This, of course, is not true. For instance, the Constitution of India states that there is a Hindu majority religion and the rest are minority religions. Even within the minority religion it makes a distinction between the larger denominations and 'others'. Islam, Sikhism, Christianity, Jainism and Buddhism as one category and Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Bahaim, together with animistic forms of religion falls in the latter category. Hinduism itself, is not a homogenous category and, therefore, certainly not a community. So it is with other religious denominations. A special scheme has been inaugurated by the State for the minorities but that does not cover the most deprived Dalit castes and tribal denominations, as they are clubbed as a denomination within Hinduism or other religions. Additionally, the State does not recognize culturally deprived status such as SCs status even amongst the Muslims and Christian denominations. It is acknowledged that many of the Muslims and Christians are Scheduled Castes converts from Hinduism. Moreover, what happens when an individual does not

want to be identified by any religious identity or by an identity that is not legitimated by the Indian State?

Similarly, in the post-independence period, the States were reorganized on the basis of administrative territories which were demarcated on linguistic grounds. Further, these linguistic States were catalogued in terms of forward and backward categories and attempt was made to 'create temples of modernity and development' in backward States. Even within linguistic States, areas were notified as backward and forward. Therefore, some States such as the BIMARU States have always received larger grants-in-aid from the Centre. It is pertinent to note that the North-Eastern States have always been high on literacy level. But this does not mean that they are highly developed.

A similar exercise in categorizing the tribal population was also undertaken. The total tribal population constitutes approximately 8 per cent of the total population of the country. The Constitution recognizes 573 communities as Scheduled Tribes and the rest as other tribes. The former groups of tribals enjoy the Constitutional benefit of reservations in education and employment, the latter do not. But even within the former group the benefits accrue only when the individual is applying for reservation within the geographical region in which the tribe is recognized as part of Scheduled Tribes or when applying for a Central Government employment. In other administrative regions or linguistic States the individual belonging to the Scheduled Tribes is considered as a general category individual. Certain areas within the linguistic States were also given special status – Tribal areas and Scheduled areas which have a special tribal plan grant in each Central and State budgets.

Similarly, the Indian State recognizes 18 official languages, but in all, there exists over 300 languages most of them tribal languages which over the time have been marginalized to such an extent that most of them do not have a script. They are practised and transmitted orally or sometimes scripts of other 'mainstream' languages are used. The idea that linguistic groups consist of homogenous individuals, and are communities, is itself misleading. This kind of categorization of linguistic groups has led to construction of loaded stereotypes. These stereotypes then become exclusionary mechanisms in time. These tribal languages do not get the same attention from the State as some dominant languages do.

When it comes to categorizing castes, the task becomes rather impossible as there are innumerable 'jatis' specific to a region or territory in India and also because caste-based census was given up after 1931. Based on cultural (erstwhile untouchable jatis) and educational backwardness index, the Constitution acknowledged a special category called the Scheduled Castes. Again, this category was tied to territorial spaces/linguistic States. It was also acknowledged that there was a high correlation between caste and class (Omvedt, 1982). This led to inauguration of a new category called the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) which was based on the criterion that these communities were backward due to reasons of cultural exclusion. Scholars, however, have demonstrated that this is not a homogenous community and is stratified in terms of *haves and have nots*. In many States, it is a section of this category that actually constitutes the political elite for instance the *Reddys, Kammas, Lingayat, Yadav, Kurmis, Jats* and *Vokkaligas* among others (Brass, 1990; Frankel and Rao, 1990; Harriss, 2003).

To conclude, this paper has endeavoured to shed light on the faulty premises under which the Indian State functions and operates. The Scheduled Castes in India, even to date, face stigma in the form of untouchability and discrimination in public facilities, residence choice, eating places, temples, fines, imprisonment among others. According to Thorat and Newman (2010) they also face discrimination in the form of caste-based labour. In Manipur too, the Scheduled Castes individuals when compared to individuals of forward castes, are denied employment, are paid less than others, are overworked and are made to remain unskilled. According to official statistics, the Scheduled Castes constitute 14 per cent of the total population of the country of which 90 per cent live in rural areas and are, in some regions, still bound by a modified form of *balutedari* or feudal system (Government of India, 2010; Shah et al., 2006).

Deshpande (2011) has calculated the occupational levels of household heads of major States into four categories, i.e. Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribes, Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and Forward Castes, based on the NFHS-III data. According to her calculation, the Scheduled Castes as a percentage of their total population are found to be in the following categories: (a) not

working 4.94 per cent, (b) manual labourers and farmers 67.54 per cent, (c) clerical workers, sales workers, service workers and merchants 14.03 per cent, (d) creative workers and artisans 9.77 per cent, (e) professional, technical and administrative managers (low level) 3.44 per cent, (f) professional technical and administrative managers (high level) 0.28 per cent. These statistical figures demonstrate how marginalized and deprived this section of society is and that despite Constitutional safeguards, individuals from this community face discrimination and are also subject to stigma and labelling. The case study that follows, illustrates the condition of the individuals belonging to the Scheduled Castes. The situation is no different in the North-Eastern States. In Manipur, the Scheduled Castes communities do not enjoy the Constitutional provisions meant for them and this is a major concern.

What this paper reflects on, is whether the classificatory policies of the Indian State need to be revamped so as to become sensitive to the issues of the Scheduled Castes and other Dalit members of society. We need to ensure that classification amongst themselves do not exclude exercising of citizenship.

Notes

1. Census of India, 2001, Data Highlights: The Scheduled Castes of Manipur. The figures in the parenthesis indicate the percentage of each community as a ratio to the total numbers of Scheduled Castes in Manipur as notified by the Constitution.
2. According to the 2001 Census there are 33 Scheduled Tribes in Manipur - Aimol, Anal, Angami, Chiru, Chothe, Gange, Hmar, Kabui, Kacha Naga, Koirao, Koireng, Kom, Lamgang, Mizo, Lushai, Maram, Maring, Mao, Monsang, Moyon, Paite, Ralte, Sema, Simte, Suhte, Tangkhul, Thadou, Vaiphei, Zou, Poumei Naga, Tarao, Kharam and any Kuki tribes. These tribal groups generally reside in the hill districts of Manipur. The Mao tribe is predominantly found in the Senapati district, the Tangkhuls in Ukhrul, the Kabuis in Tamenglong, the Anals and Maring in Chandel and Thadous, Kuki and Paite in Churachandpur district. According to 2001 Census, the Scheduled Tribes population was 7.41 lakhs (3.74 males and 3.67 females) as against 6.32 lakhs in 1991 Census. There are 7 Scheduled Castes communities in Manipur. They are Loi, Yaithabi, Dhobi, Muchi or Rabidas, Namsudra, Patni and

Sutradhar. The total Scheduled Castes population in Manipur was 60 thousand (30 thousand males and 30 thousand females) in 2001 Census.

3. Churachandpur is a hilly district and the two main ethnic groups that are predominant are the Kukis and the Paites. This district has been a site of ethnic clash in the 1997 (between the Paite and the Kukis) that in time spread to other parts of Manipur and even to adjoining States of Mizoram and Nagaland. Churachandpur is also a special case because this district falls under the constitutional provision, i.e. scheduled area under article 371. This provision entails that instead of 'normal' Panchayat system these areas have an institution called tribal councils which are also based on the principle of representation through election (Baruah, 2005).
4. The well known insurgent groups are Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), United National Liberation Front (UNLF), Revolutionary Peoples Front (RPF), People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), Manipur Liberation Front Army (MLFA), Kanglei Yawol Khenna Lup (KYKL), Revolutionary Joint Committee (RJC), Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP), Peoples United Liberation Front (PULF), National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K), National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM), Naga Lim Guard (NLG), Kuki National Front (KNF), Kuki National Army (KNA), Kuki Defense Force (KDF), Kuki Democratic Movement (KDM), Kuki National Organisation (KNO), Kuki Security Force (KSF), Chin Kuki Revolutionary Front (CKRF), Kom Rem Peoples Convention (KRPC), Zomi Revolutionary Volunteers (ZRV), Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA), Zomi Reunification Organisation (ZRO), and Hmar Peoples Convention (HPC).
5. The literacy rate of Manipur is among the highest in India as well as in Northeast. The literacy has increased from 59.89 per cent in 1991 to 68.87 per cent in 2001. The male ratio is 71.63 per cent to 77.87 per cent while the female increased from 47.60 to 59.70 per cent.

References

- Bajpai, R. (2011), *Debating Difference: Group Rights and Liberal Democracy in India*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.
- Baruah, S. (2005), *Durable Disorder: Understanding the Politics of Northeast India*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.
- Brass, P. (1985), *Caste, Faction and Party in Indian Politics, Vol. II: Election Studies*, Chanakya Press, New Delhi.

- . (1968), 'Coalition Politics in North India', *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXII, pp. 1174–1191.
- . (2004), 'Elite Interests, Popular Passions and Social Power in the Language Politics of India', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 353–375.
- . (1991), *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*, Sage Publications, New Delhi.
- . (2002), 'India, Myron Weiner and the Political Science of Development', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 37, No. 29, pp. 3026–3040.
- . (1984), 'National Power and Local Politics in India: A Twenty-Year Perspective', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 89–118.
- . (1990), *The New Cambridge History of India, Vol. 4: The Politics of India Since Independence*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- . (2003), *The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India*, University of Washington Press, Seattle.
- . (2000), 'The Strong State and the Fear of Disorder', in Francine R. Frankel et al. (eds), *Transforming India: Social and Political Dynamics of Democracy*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, pp. 60–88.
- Brass, P. and Achin Vanaik (eds) (2002), *Competing Nationalisms in South Asia: Essays for Asghar Ali Engineer*, Orient Longman, Hyderabad.
- Chatterjee, P. (1986), *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World*, Zed Books, London.
- . (1993), *The Nation and its Fragments*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- . (2004), *The Politics of the Governed: Popular Politics in Most of the World*, Columbia University Press, New York.
- Chatterjee, P. (ed.) (1997 and 1998), *State and Politics in India*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.
- Das, B. (ed.) (1963), *Thus Spoke Ambedkar*, Vol. 1, Buddhist Publishing House, Jalandhar.
- Davey, B. (1975), *The Economic Development of India: A Marxist Analysis*, Spokesman Books, Nottingham.
- Deshpande, A. (2011), *The Grammar of Caste: Economic Discrimination in Contemporary India*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.
- Government of India (2001), *Census Report*, Ministry of Home Affairs, Delhi.
- . (2011), *Census Report* (Provisional Population Figures), http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011-prov-results/paper2/data_files/manipur/Manipur_Paper_2_Vol_12.pdf
- . (2010), *Report of the National Commission for Scheduled Castes*, Delhi.

- Laishram, S. Bidhan (2004). 'Manipur and the Paradox of Security', Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, <http://www.ipcs.org/article/terrorism-in-northeast/manipur-and-the-paradox-of-security-1456.html> assessed on 19 September 2011.
- Mahajan, G. (ed.) (2011), *Accommodating Diversity: Ideas and Institutional Practices*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.
- Nag, S. (2002), *Contesting Marginality: Ethnicity, Insurgence and Sub-Nationalism in North-East India*, Manohar Publishers, New Delhi.
- Roy, A. (2010), *Mapping Citizenship in India*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi.
- Shah, G., H. Mander, S. Thorat, S. Deshpande and A. Baviskar (eds) (2006), *Untouchability in Rural India*, Sage Publications, New Delhi.